

PUTTING THE 'NZ' BACK INTO ANZUS: DOES IT MATTER?

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PUTTING THE 'NZ' BACK INTO ANZUS: DOES IT MATTER?

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ABSTRACT

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In 1951, the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty was signed. This treaty was written when there was concern of communist expansion into South East Asia and beyond. In 1986, New Zealand's membership of this treaty was suspended by the United States due to incompatible positions regarding nuclear weapons: New Zealand declared itself nuclear free, and the United States would neither confirm nor deny if any of its ships visiting New Zealand were nuclear-powered or nuclear capable. Over the last 20 years, the two countries have managed to work around their differences to foster a close defense relationship. This Strategy Research Project examines the current defense relationship between New Zealand and the United States and offers suggestions for the way forward. The paper concludes that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. First, the treaty is no longer relevant and serves no purpose in the 21st century. Second, the nuclear debate is irreconcilable and should not be the central issue in the defense relationship. What *does* matter is how New Zealand and the United States can progress their defense relationship as they navigate their way through the complex international environment.

PUTTING THE 'NZ' BACK INTO ANZUS: DOES IT MATTER?

The time has come to part. We part as friends, but we part.

—George P. Shultz
US Secretary of State¹

It was with these words that the United States signaled to the Prime Minister of New Zealand that its patience had run out.² New Zealand was suspended from the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty by the United States (US), and the political relationship between the two countries was at an all-time low. A lot has occurred over the last 21 years: The cold war has ended, the United States has confirmed itself as the sole super-power, and the events of 9/11 have resulted in a so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT). During this time, New Zealand and the United States have managed to work around the suspension of the ANZUS Treaty to develop a cooperative defense relationship. However, despite this, there has been no formal progress on the ANZUS Treaty, and New Zealand remains officially suspended from the alliance.

Much has been written about causes of the rift and many authors have offered opinions as to how the 'NZ' can be put back into ANZUS.³ However, most literature on this subject has been retrospective and has not taken into account the strategic environment that now exists. It is therefore the aim of this research paper to examine the current defense relationship between the United States and New Zealand and to offer some suggestions for the way forward. This will be achieved by first providing some context to the debate by looking at the history of the treaty and the developments over the last 21 years. Next, the key issues will be examined from the perspectives of

both New Zealand and the United States. Finally, the paper will conclude with an assessment of what needs to be done to progress the defense relationship further.

It is the thesis of this paper that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. It does not matter for two reasons. First, the treaty is no longer relevant and serves no purpose in the 21st century. Second, the nuclear debate is irreconcilable and should not be the central issue in the defense relationship. What *does* matter is how New Zealand and the United States can progress their defense relationship as they navigate their way through the complex international environment.

A Brief History

As mentioned above, it is not the aim of the author to dwell on the past. However, in order to provide context for the reader, it is important to understand how the ANZUS Treaty came to be, what actually caused the rift, and what has occurred in the 21 years since New Zealand was suspended.

In 1950, the strategic attention of New Zealand and the United States was focused on North East Asia, Japan, and Korea.⁴ Each nation was concerned about communist expansion into South East Asia and the onset of the cold war. In addition, New Zealand sought a security guarantee to deal with the possibility of a resurgent Japan.⁵ After a series of negotiations between Australia, the United States, and New Zealand, the ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. This was an extremely important milestone in New Zealand international relations because it was the first time that New Zealand had signed a treaty with a foreign power without the participation of the United Kingdom. In many ways, it was New Zealand's first venture into global politics without the cocoon of the British Empire.⁶

The treaty itself is very short and contains only 11 Articles. Of particular note is Article Three, which states that the parties shall *consult* with each other whenever, in their opinions, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific.⁷ This is important because it is open to interpretation by each of the parties and requires no action except dialogue. As an example, after the 9/11 bombings, Australian Prime Minister John Howard immediately invoked ANZUS as a means to demonstrate how Australia would be willing to help; New Zealand did not.

After the treaty was signed, New Zealand demonstrated its commitment to regional security by fighting alongside American and Australian troops in Korea and Vietnam. Indeed, in the 1970s, ANZUS was officially being described as the keystone of New Zealand's security.⁸ However, in the early 1980s, some of this consensus began to erode as the middle class peace movement gained popularity and the labour party was voted into power. The new Prime Minister, David Lange, sought to denounce French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and promote New Zealand as a nuclear-free nation. At this point, it was becoming evident that New Zealand and the United States had divergent views with respect to the use of nuclear powered ships and carriage of nuclear weapons.

In 1985, things came to a head. Following a request from the United States for a port visit by the destroyer USS Buchanan, the New Zealand government would only grant permission if the ship were certified as not carrying nuclear weapons. As this would have breached the long-standing United States policy of *neither confirming nor denying* the presence of nuclear weapons, the visit did not take place.⁹ Subsequent negotiations did not resolve the issue, and the United States government declared it

would not take part in future ANZUS Council meetings in company with New Zealand.¹⁰ This effectively signaled New Zealand's suspension from the alliance resulting in New Zealand being viewed by the United States as a friend rather than close ally.¹¹ Thus, the conditions that led to the statement by Secretary Shultz were set in place, and the countries parted ways.

Following this, the United States cut off all routine military training links with New Zealand for individuals and units, discontinued the flow of military intelligence, and refused to participate in multi-lateral exercises if New Zealand were going to be present.¹² These punitive measures and the official policy toward New Zealand relations were laid out in the National Security Decision Directive 193 (NSDD193), signed by US President Ronald Reagan, in October 1985.¹³ Although over 20 years old, staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) still refer to this directive when dealing with New Zealand defense policy matters.

In 1986, New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was cemented further with the enacting of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Disarmament and Arms Control Act.¹⁴ In addition to the concern regarding nuclear weapons, this initiative also prevented New Zealand from allowing nuclear-powered vessels into its territorial waters, thus formalizing its anti-nuclear policy stance.

During the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand was careful not to give the impression that it was adopting an isolationist policy. Accordingly, it looked to Australia to strengthen military ties. For example, a Multi-Level Logistic Agreement was signed, a large order for ANZAC class frigates was placed, and a Closer Defense Relationship was formalized.¹⁵ In addition, New Zealand worked diplomatically to

reassure the United States that its outlook on fundamental foreign policy issues had not changed. To reinforce this, New Zealand continued to cooperate militarily with the United States in a range of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, the Balkans, and South East Asia.¹⁶

Despite these foreign policy initiatives being adopted by the then current New Zealand government, the nuclear issue now has strong bipartisan support in New Zealand politics, and each of the major parties realizes that any attempt to repeal anti-nuclear legislation will not be accepted by the voting public. It is therefore an issue that is unlikely to be changed, irrespective of which political party is in power. Likewise, it is improbable that the United States will change its neither confirm nor deny policy. The net result of these positions is a stalemate that has hampered progress on *formal* defense relations for more than two decades.

So where does all this leave the security relationship now? Whereas the 1990s could best be described as a *thawing* of the relationship, the first seven years of the new century could be described as a *warming* of the relationship. In the post 9/11 environment, the United States has been very keen to obtain coalition partners for the war on terror as well as for other mutual security concerns. In this regard, New Zealand has provided a number of Special Air Service (SAS) contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and still maintains a 120-person Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamian, Afghanistan. Of note, the SAS received a US Presidential Unit Citation for their actions as part of OEF. Additionally, New Zealand Navy frigates are currently working alongside United States Navy ships in the Persian Gulf.

With an understanding of what has gone before, the issues that might move the relationship forward can now be examined. As it was then, and as it is appropriate now, the relationship is best viewed through the lens of each country.

New Zealand Perspective

From a New Zealand perspective, the relationship is best viewed in terms of the effects of the punitive measures outlined in NSDD193. Exercises and training, interoperability, intelligence sharing and, access to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are noteworthy. Comment will also be made with respect to New Zealand's pursuit of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

First, the restriction preventing New Zealand from not participating in large military exercises is one area where the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is particularly affected. Over the last 20 years, New Zealand has not been actively involved in large-scale exercises involving the United States. To make up for this shortfall, the NZDF increased bilateral exercises with Australia, while maintaining close contact with the other Five Power Defense Arrangement countries.¹⁷ However, over time, the NZDF has missed a number of opportunities to measure itself against the technological superiority of the United States military. Conversely, the United States military does not get to observe the NZDF capabilities and suitability as a potential coalition partner. Fortunately, the problems imposed by this restriction are not insurmountable. For example, if formally requested by New Zealand, OSD has the ability to grant waivers if the proposed engagement were in the interest of the United States.¹⁸ It is interesting to note, that while New Zealand has not been able to officially exercise with the United States, there have been no problems in serving along side each other on operations.

There have also been some restrictions that pertain to NZDF personnel conducting training in the United States. However, it would be fair to say that these restrictions have been gradually relaxed over the last 20 years. With respect to individual training, NZDF personnel have regularly attended trade and promotion courses, as well as War Colleges and Component Commanders Courses. As an example, in 2007, there were training opportunities for 62 NZDF personnel in the United States and this number has steadily increased over the last ten years. Not all of these posts have been filled, primarily due to NZDF funding limitations rather than any training restrictions imposed by the United States.¹⁹ With respect to unit level training, the restrictions of NSDD193 have had an impact because OSD approval is required many months in advance. However, most applications are met favorably, and units from the Royal New Zealand Air Force have often trained with their United States counterparts.

Second, as the only super-power, the United States sets the defacto standards for interoperability. It is therefore important for the NZDF to remain interoperable with the United States in order to be effectively integrated into any future operations. The restrictions imposed by NSDD193 have not had a significant impact on New Zealand's ability to operate with the United States forces. This is because New Zealand has been able to access military interoperability forums such as the American British Canada Australia (ABCA) forum.²⁰ In March 2006, the New Zealand Army was granted full membership of the ABCA and effectively became the fifth member. This has allowed New Zealand to remain current with the United States and other western countries. Additionally, the New Zealand Air Force and Navy are also full members of their respective interoperability forums. Membership of the Air and Space Interoperability

Council has enabled the New Zealand Air Force full access to the doctrine, procedures, technical information, and free equipment loans between member nations.²¹ The NZDF also actively participates in other interoperability fora such as the Combined Communications Electronics Board and the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations.²²

The NZDF also shares an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the United States. This agreement enhances readiness interoperability and provides a cost effective means for mutual logistics support.²³ Despite no longer being an ally, having an ACSA with the United States reinforces the notion that NSDD193 can be worked around when operational need takes priority.

Third, when New Zealand was formally suspended from ANZUS, some of its intelligence privileges were withdrawn. NSDD193 formally refers to “an adjustment” in intelligence cooperation.²⁴ However, more recently, New Zealand has been able to access more intelligence, particularly when it relates to operational areas such as Afghanistan, where New Zealand and United States forces are serving side by side. Similarly, in the post 9/11 environment, New Zealand has been fully engaged on matters involving terrorists, drug smuggling, and persons of interest moving between countries. Conversely, there have been some restraints with regard to the acquisition of intelligence from a third party, such as Australia’s inability to forward United States-sourced information. However, this issue is more a function of United States legislation rather than the result of suspension from the ANZUS alliance.

Fourth, with regard to Foreign Military Sales and commercial export licenses for defense equipment, NSDD193 states that, “New Zealand should no longer be accorded

the special relationship of a very close ally and should be treated in a manner similar to other friendly nations.”²⁵ However, over the years this has proved not to be the case. Procurement staff at the New Zealand Embassy currently have full access to the FMS program, and are treated with the same status as other United States allies. All users pay the same price for United States military goods, although some of the larger nations such as the United Kingdom are able to take advantage of economies of scale. The United States does reserve the option to change priority on orders for high demand items such as Kevlar body armor. However, this is done according to the operational need rather than on the basis of which country is submitting the order. Over half of the NZDF’s major assets are United States-sourced, including all of its key air assets.²⁶ It is therefore assessed that New Zealand’s suspension from ANZUS has had no impact on its ability to access military equipment from the United States.

The final area that warrants attention from a New Zealand perspective is the Free Trade Agreement. This is very important as the United States is the second largest destination of New Zealand exports. Officially, the pursuit of such an agreement should be separate from a security relationship although it is reasonable to envision how they can be linked. New Zealand is not on the list of approved countries to obtain an FTA, and it is understood that this will be revisited by the Trade Promotion Authority in March 2008.²⁷ In comparison, Australia has recently achieved an FTA with the United States. This bid was officially fast-tracked and may have been supported due to Australia’s status as a staunch ally. It is therefore assessed that it *might* be easier for New Zealand to obtain an FTA if it were still an ally of the United States. However, at the working level it is felt that the total value of trade between the two countries is low compared to larger-

trading nations, and this is probably the key obstacle that would need to be addressed before an FTA could become a reality.²⁸

United States Perspective

From a United States perspective, the relationship is best viewed in terms of the extent to which New Zealand is able to assist the United States in pursuing its security interests. The Global War on Terror, South Pacific security, third-party negotiations, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and military exercises are key factors.

At both the political and military levels, the United States clearly understands the anomalies that exist with respect to the defense relationship between the two countries. Despite the nuclear issue and restraints of NSDD193, the relationship appears to be as close as it has been in decades. In his submission to the United States Senate, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Glyn Davies, stated that, "...our bilateral relationship is excellent and both countries have decided not to let their policy differences define the entire relationship."²⁹ This view has been shared by senior United States politicians during various visits to New Zealand and at international meetings as well.³⁰

What are the issues that define the United States approach to the defense relationship, and why does it appear that it has worked around its own mandates in order to make the relationship a success? First, there is the GWOT. It is the declaratory policy of the United States, stated in documents such as the National Defense Strategy, that global partnerships must be strengthened.³¹ With trans-national threats increasing, the United States and other like-minded countries need to demonstrate a unity of action to deter terrorism from spreading. In this environment, it simply does not make sense to

allow a policy disagreement to prevent such progress. New Zealand forces are currently serving along side their American counterparts in Afghanistan and the Middle East, which is very much appreciated by the current US administration. Looking ahead, the environment of persistent conflict as described by United States Army General George Casey, gives further weight to the argument that like-minded nations need to come together against the common threat.³²

Second, the United States understands that New Zealand, along with Australia, plays a vital security role in the South Pacific. It is of some comfort to the United States that it can rely on New Zealand and Australia to take leading roles in some of the hot spots such as East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji. The United States Ambassador to New Zealand, William McCormick, acknowledges that New Zealand's strong cultural tie to the South Pacific "...provides an anchor in the region that the United States does not have."³³ New Zealand can therefore be used to help build relations with South Pacific nations to keep them firmly on the side on the United States.³⁴ This should not be underestimated, as it is well known that both China and Taiwan are using "checkbook" diplomacy to gain favor with South Pacific leaders.³⁵

Third, from a United States perspective, New Zealand can also be useful as a third party when dealing with countries who may not always engage the United States directly. It can act as an honest broker in regions of the world where United States presence may not be welcomed. For example, in November 2007, the New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters, made a visit to North Korea and expressed concerns about its nuclear program. At the conclusion of that visit, he flew to the United States to debrief Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on his findings.³⁶

Fourth, the United States also sees New Zealand as an active partner in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a United States-led initiative that aims to reduce the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from falling into the wrong hands. The United States appreciates the position that New Zealand has taken with respect to North Korea and Iran: It relies on New Zealand to explain the importance of the initiative to Pacific Island countries and others in the Asia Pacific Region.³⁷

Finally, the issue of New Zealand not participating in military exercises with the United States continues to be problematic and could be described as the last piece in the mosaic required in order to fully restore defense relations.³⁸ Here the initiative still rests with the United States; it approves New Zealand participation on a case-by-case basis. Over recent years, there have been two clear reasons why the United States approach to New Zealand participation in exercises has softened. These are the GWOT and PSI. If it can be demonstrated that exercising together will have a direct and positive impact on the efforts in the global war on terror, then it may be likely that New Zealand participation would be welcomed. For example, prior to deploying to Afghanistan, the New Zealand Air Force conducted significant build-up training with the United States Air Force (USAF). Likewise, with respect to PSI, the former Pacific Commander, US Navy Admiral William Fallon, in his March 2007 report to Congress, highlighted New Zealand participation in PSI exercises Pacific Protector and Deep Sabre.³⁹

This softening of attitude indicates that the United States perceives the benefits of such training as outweighing the adherence to a Presidential Directive written over 20 years ago. This makes for a strong argument that the exercise regime should be

formally reinstated. Is what New Zealand brings to the table sufficient to make the case for the United States to abandon one of the last underpinnings of its response to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy?⁴⁰ The convergence of interests brought about by the GWOT, PSI, and economics suggests that the answer is yes.

In reality, it is not that simple for the United States to welcome New Zealand back with open arms. At the political and diplomatic level, New Zealand cannot be seen as "getting away with it." This could create a precedent for other like-minded nations to follow. For example, Japan has a nuclear-free policy, but has found ways to accommodate US Navy ships without forcing the neither confirm nor deny issue. It is perhaps in the best interest of the United States to maintain good military relations with New Zealand, while still reserving the right to default to NSDD193. After all, NSDD193 still remains extant United States policy unless formally overturned.

Assessment and Options

Now that the issues of both countries have been addressed, it is appropriate to review the situation and to examine options for the way ahead. Quite clearly, the relationship between the two countries demonstrates that there are more interests shared than there are differences. In the last few years, there has been an increased number of high level visits between the two countries. In March 2007, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clarke, met with US President George W. Bush and key officials in Washington. This was followed in September by a visit from New Zealand's Foreign Minister to the US Secretary of State. At the diplomatic level, New Zealand recently hosted the United States-New Zealand partnership forum. This was the second of such forums, with the inaugural one held in Washington in 2006.⁴¹

The one significant difference that does exist, relates to the nuclear issue. As already mentioned in this paper, this issue is considered irreconcilable and prevents New Zealand from being reinstated back into ANZUS as a full alliance partner. Accordingly, this leaves two broad options for the way ahead: either preserve the status quo or take steps to formalize a bilateral United States and New Zealand relationship that would replace the ANZUS Treaty. These options are discussed below.

Status Quo

From a New Zealand perspective, continuing with the status quo has many benefits, but is certainly not a “do-nothing” option. The trend over the last 20 years of warming relations needs to continue and the onus will remain on New Zealand to work at the relationship. This is because, in the current circumstances, New Zealand has the most to gain. Furthermore, New Zealand would need to continue to seek opportunities to work with the United States military and to demonstrate that it can be a reliable coalition partner.

From a United States perspective, a continued low-key approach would need to be maintained for this option to work. Any act deemed as looking too favorably toward New Zealand could raise concerns in some quarters as to the apparent contradiction between the close relationship and extant policy. However, the United States could continue to pursue opportunities with New Zealand for mutual benefit that would support its national interests. For example, further progress could be made in pursuing non-proliferation, counter terrorism, and stability in the South Pacific. Additionally, maintaining the steady growth in relations with New Zealand is considered a good

investment for the future. If General Casey's assessment of persistent conflict is correct, then the United States must cultivate closer relationships with like-minded nations.

There are drawbacks with this option. The most obvious is that the warm nature of this relationship is contrary to extant United States government policy guidance contained in NSDD193. This means that at the working level, each country has to circumvent the obstacles contained therein in order to make the relationship work. The second drawback is that the nuclear issue will unnecessarily remain at the center of the New Zealand-United States relationship. While this is not the case in practice, it will always be picked up on by media commentators until such a time as the policy position of either country changes. By default then, the nuclear issue still acts as an impediment to formally improving defense relations. This point was made by Admiral Fallon during his March 2007 report to congress when he said "...the Government of New Zealand's 1987 legislative ban of nuclear-powered ships in its waters remains an obstacle to improved military-to-military relations."⁴²

Bilateral Defense Relationship

The second option available presents an alternate view that the strategic environment is such that the ANZUS Treaty is outdated. After all, the treaty was written in the post WWII era and the rift occurred at the height of the cold war; neither of these events is relevant to the current problems of the 21st century. This option would see the ANZUS Treaty disbanded and another type of defense relationship established between New Zealand and the United States. This could take the form of a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement.

The key advantage to this approach is that it could strengthen the relationship further and could be viewed as the next logical step in the current relationship. In addition, there is the benefit of putting the nuclear issue to bed once and for all. If each country were able to formally agree over its differences and move on to a formal defense agreement, then there could conceivably be no further barriers to prevent progress in the future.

There are a number of drawbacks in pursuing this course of action. First, what is there to be gained from forming a new defense relationship that cannot be achieved in the current circumstances? There is also a real practical issue of trying to implement it. New Zealand would need to be formally expelled from ANZUS prior to a new bilateral agreement being signed, and these changes would require formal staffing through to the United States Congress. This would also leave Australia in a position of having to reformulate its policy arrangements with the United States. Another disadvantage with this approach relates to feasibility. If this option were to be adopted, then the United States would be sending the message that it is happy to have formal defense relations with a country that will not guarantee United States naval forces port access nor transit rights through its territorial waters. This course of action therefore provides the United States with little to gain and a lot to lose.

A Way Ahead

On balance, the status quo option has the most chance of success and prosperity in the future. It does have the drawback of having to work around the nuclear policy difference; however, this is considered much more workable than trying to formalize an alternative arrangement. Each nation fully understands that the nuclear issue precludes

a formal alliance and the status of the current relationship demonstrates that each country can work beyond this single issue. There is also some common ground that can be found between the United States-led PSI and New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance. The option exists for the United States to declare respect for New Zealand's nuclear position and to explain how this contributes to the aim of reducing the illegal shipments of WMD. Such a policy statement would be a tacit acknowledgment that each country agrees to disagree and can still work together to achieve common objectives.⁴³ However, New Zealand needs to be mindful not to push too hard in the relationship: It must recognize that the United States has to manage the contradiction between its declaratory policy and what is happening in reality.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is clear that the NZDF has not suffered greatly due to the restrictions placed upon it by NSDD193. It can be argued that the lack of exercising and training with the United States has had little impact on the NZDF capability. Likewise, the interoperability forum and FMS programs have remained open and there has been increased intelligence sharing in the post 9/11 environment. In many regards, the NZDF is more capable today than it has been in the last 30 years.⁴⁴

There have been some political rough spots over the years, and most recently one occurred with Prime Minister Clarke's comments, in December 2003, about the war in Iraq: She stated that the war might not have occurred under a democratic-led American government.⁴⁵ At the military level however, there has been a close relationship, and it is as good now as it has ever been in the last 20 years or so. From an NZDF perspective, it would appear that most of the restrictive measures of NSDD193 have

been worked around, and New Zealand enjoys extremely good military relations with the United States.

There is a note of caution. New Zealand is unable to conduct and sustain significant military operations independently and therefore requires robust defense relations. It has such a relationship with Australia, but less so with the United States.⁴⁶ It is therefore in New Zealand's interest to keep working at the relationship and to promote the NZDF as a modern and capable force able to play its part in the contemporary strategic environment.

It is the strong feeling of the author that if things continue as they are at present, then there is every reason to suggest that the relationship will continue to improve despite the disagreement over one policy issue. The relationship has matured greatly over the last 20 years since Secretary Shultz made his comments about New Zealand and the United States having to part. Due to a common values system, shared interests, and mutual respect, the two countries have been drawn closer together than they have been in a long time.

In some respects, the relationship can be described as water negotiating rocks in a stream. Each country may approach problems in a different manner, but each is traveling in the same direction. It is therefore concluded that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. What is more important, is that New Zealand and the United States continue to develop their relationship to work together as they navigate their way through the complex international environment of the 21st century.

Endnotes

¹ Comments made in Manila July 1986, while George Shultz was Secretary of State.

² Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally: New Zealand at Odds With Its Past* (Sydney NSW: Brassey's, 1990), 1.

³ A search on academic databases reveals that the overwhelming majority of articles and papers concerning the New Zealand and United States Defense relationship, focus on the nuclear issue. In general, they outline causes for the rift and what how the nuclear issue might be tackled. There is very little literature available concerning where the relationship can go in the future.

⁴ Kevin R. Short, *The ANZUS Rift: The Politics of the Matter* (Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama: Air War College, April 1999), 4.

⁵ The United States were concerned with how to rebuild both Germany and Japan, while New Zealand was more concerned with measures taken to prevent a resurgence of Japan.

⁶ Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 123.

⁷ Steve Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook* (Wellington New Zealand: Oxford University Press, 1989), 101 -103.

⁸ New Zealand Government, *Review of Defence Policy 1972: New Zealands Defence Policy Perspectives* (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993), 16.

⁹ Jim Rolfe, "Lets Just Be Friends: New Zealand and the United States" *Asian Affairs: An American View* (Summer 2003), 122.

¹⁰ Jamieson, 3.

¹¹ An ally is a party that has a formal and recognized relationship with another; hence an alliance. A friend exists when parties have mutual interests and is considered a less formal status than an ally.

¹² Rolfe, 123.

¹³ This policy was secret when written, but has since been declassified. Note also that the contents of this Directive were not made public, and the official policy towards New Zealand was not publicized until June 1986. NSDD193 is available from <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-193.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

¹⁴ This act was enacted in 1986 and formally signed on 4 June 1987.

¹⁵ The CDR agreement was signed in 1991 and was designed to significantly increase the degree of cooperation between Wellington and Canberra in equipment purchases, force structure decisions, and related matters.

¹⁶ Rolfe, 123.

¹⁷ FPDA – Five Power Defense Arrangement (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and United Kingdom).

¹⁸ Interview with Commodore Williams, New Zealand Defense Attaché to the United States. Conducted 8 October 2007. In the past, OSD has granted waivers for a number of defense activities to occur between the United States and New Zealand.

¹⁹ Steven Cuming, Coordinator Foreign Military Sales Headquarters NZDF e-mail message to author, 12 December 2007.

²⁰ ABCA - America, Britain, Canada and Australia. This is an Army interoperability forum, with similar organizations established for Air Force and Navy.

²¹ Available from <http://www.airstandards.com/ascc/>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2007.

²² Short, 27.

²³ Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander US Pacific Command. *Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives*, 31 March 2004; available from <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml>; Internet; accessed 15 August 2007.

²⁴ Ronald Reagan, "US Policy on the New Zealand Port Access Issue," *National Security Decision Directive Number 193* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 21 October 1985); available from <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-193.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ New Zealand Defense Force Public Relations Pamphlet, *New Zealand: Meeting Our Strategic Interests and Obligations* (Wellington: undated)

²⁷ Interview with Commodore Williams, New Zealand Defense Attaché to the United States. Conducted on 8 October 2007.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Glyn Davies, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Statement before the Sub Committee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: 15 March 2007).

³⁰ Christopher Dore, "Clinton Suggests Revival of ANZUS," *The Australian* (September 16, 1999): 7 [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 6 September 2007.

³¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, March 2005), iv.

³² These criteria have been determined by a Washington Think Tank and publicly announced by General Casey on a number of occasions. Available from Defense Talk Website http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/army/Army_Preparing_for_Future_of_Conflict110012936.php; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007.

³³ Ambassador William P. McCormick, Ambassador to New Zealand, Speech to the Institute of International Affairs, Wellington 10 May 2007; available from <http://newzealand.usembassy.gov/nziia07.html>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

³⁴ Davies, 1.

³⁵ Davies, 3.

³⁶ Fairfax News, *New Zealand and United States Have Reached New Levels*; available from <http://www.stuff.co.nz/print/4281855a6160.html>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2007.

³⁷ McCormick, 5.

³⁸ Brandon F. Denecke, *If You Need a Friend You Have One: Reestablishing Military Training Exercises Between the U.S. and New Zealand*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 18 March 2005), 4.

³⁹ Admiral William J. Fallon, *Statement to the House Armed Services Committee*, 7 March 2007; available from <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/2007/FallonTestimony030707.html>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2007.

⁴⁰ Denecke, 6.

⁴¹ US Department of State Website: Embassy of the United States Wellington New Zealand. *Embassy News*; available from http://newzealand.usembassy.gov/fp_part_forum_2007.html; Internet; accessed 3 December 2007.

⁴² Fallon, 7.

⁴³ Andrew Scobel, *Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: Australia and New Zealand* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003) 7.

⁴⁴ Jim Rolfe, *Cutting Their Cloth: New Zealand's Defense Strategy* (Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 19 April 2007), 3. This is primarily due to an increase in funding from the government resulting in an extensive modernization program as well as the many operational deployments that have been undertaken by NZDF personnel.

⁴⁵ Bruce Vaughn. *CRS Report for Congress: New Zealand: Background and Bilateral Relations with the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 16 June 2005), 9.

⁴⁶ Rolfe, *Cutting Their Cloth: New Zealand's Defense Strategy*, 3.

